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CSA do not discover the "emotional ramifications of such abuse
until years after the abuse occurred," the proposed "legislation
would remove the barrier created by the... [strict accrual rule] in
order to enable survivors of child sexual abuse to bring civil actions
against their abusers."3 1
Under current New York law, adults who were sexually abused
as children are often required to bring suit against their alleged
abusers years before they are aware of the extent of psychological
and emotional damage from which they suffer. Although the court
in Covenant House recognized that such victims are afforded only
an elusive opportunity to seek recompense from those who have
abused them, the court was nonetheless bound by precedent to
hold that any modification to the strict accrual rule should be left
to the Legislature. The recent proposal to amend the CPLR by
providing a discovery rule to the statute of limitations for victims
of CSA suggests that the Legislature is responsive not only to the
cries of CSA victims, who have been locked out of New York
courts, but also to the judges who are bound by existing law to
throw away the key. It is now incumbent upon the Legislature to
enact the proposed amendment into law in order to prevent people
who abuse children from using the law as a shield against those
whom they have abused.
Melanie Mandery
New York Court of Appeals holds that claimant under SEQRA
must show special injury to establish standing to challenge environmental assessment performed by local agency
Environmental policy acts such as the National Environmental Policy Act ("NEPA")' and New York's State Environmental
Quality Review Act ("SEQRA") 2 require federal or state agencies3
31

Memorandum in Support of N.Y.S. 5461 (1991).

42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4370c(a) (1988). The purpose of NEPA is to create a national policy
of preventing damage to and promoting understanding of the environment. Id. § 4321. The
Act mandates that federal, state, and local governments use all "practicable means" to further this policy. Id. § 4331(a); see also WILLIAM H. RODGERS, JR., ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 697704 (1977) (providing overview of NEPA's objectives); Neil Orloff, SEQRA: New York's Reformation of NEPA, 46 ALB. L. REV. 1128, 1129 (1982) (NEPA passed in response to "lack of
attention by officials to environmental consequences of their decisions").
' N.Y. ENVTL. CONSERV. LAW §§ 8-0101 to 8-0117 (McKinney 1984 & Supp. 1991).
Twenty-eight states have enacted environmental statutes modeled after NEPA (the so-
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to evaluate and to factor into their decision-making the environmental impact 4 of their proposed actions.5 The determination of
called "little NEPAs"); SEQRA is New York's version. See Orloff, supra note 1, at 1129.
The stated purpose of SEQRA is similar to that of NEPA, i.e., to declare a state policy that
will promote environmental awareness. N.Y. ENvTL. CONSERv. LAW § 8-0101. SEQRA mandates, inter alia, the following: that state policies and laws be interpreted with a view toward
protection of the environment, id. § 8-0103(6); that environmental factors be considered
together with social and economic factors in reaching decisions on proposed activities, id.
§ 8-0103(7); and that regulatory agencies focus on preventing damage to the environment,
id. § 8-0103(9). For a discussion of the policy goals and mandates of SEQRA, see Langdon
Marsh, Symposium on the New York State Environmental Quality Review
Act-Introduction-SEQRA's Scope and Objectives, 46 ALB. L. REV. 1097, 1098-1105
(1982); Orloff, supra note 1, at 1130-32. See generally MICHAEL B. GERRARD ET AL., ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT REVIEW IN NEW YORK (1990) (comprehensive analysis of SEQRA and related
laws).
3 See N.Y. ENVTL. CONSERv. LAW § 8-0105(1)-(3) (McKinney 1984). SEQRA's broad
definitions of state and local agencies encompasses virtually every governmental entity. Id.
§ 8-0105 commentary at 65 (McKinney 1984).
4 NEPA and SEQRA enforce their environmental policies by requiring that federal and
state agencies comply with the environmental impact statement ("EIS") process. 42 U.S.C.
§ 4332(2)(C) (1988); N.Y. ENvTL. CONSERV. LAW § 8-0109 (McKinney 1984 & Supp. 1991).
For an overview of the EIS process, see Peter R. Paden, DEC's Part 617 Regulations, As
Amended: A Guide to the Implementation of SEQRA, 5 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 51 passim
(1987) (providing overview of EIS process under SEQRA); Fran Hoffinger, Comment, Environmental Impact Statements: Instruments for Environmental Protectionor Endless Litigation?, 11 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 527, 531-38 (1983) (summarizing EIS process under NEPA).
SEQRA requires that an EIS be prepared before any agency action is taken that "may
have a significant effect on the environment." N.Y. ENVTL. CONSERv. LAW § 8-0109(2) (McKinney 1984 & Supp. 1991) (emphasis added). "The threshold for requiring an EIS is relatively low and the standard for compliance is strict." Save the Pine Bush, Inc. v. Planning
Bd., 96 A.D.2d 986, 987, 466 N.Y.S.2d 828, 830 (3d Dep't), appeal dismissed, 61 N.Y.2d 668,
460 N.E.2d 230, 472 N.Y.S.2d 89, appeal denied, 61 N.Y.2d 602, 460 N.E.2d 231, 472
N.Y.S.2d 1025 (1983); see also [1991] 6 N.Y.C.R.R § 617.11 (criteria for determining environmental significance). Certain types of actions, such as replacing an existing facility in
kind or repaving an existing highway, are presumed to have no significant environmental
effects. Id. § 617.13. As to other actions, an agency may make a determination that no significant environmental harm will result from its proposed action and issue a "negative declaration" to that effect, thus avoiding the necessity of preparing an EIS. See id. § 617.2(y)
(defining negative declaration); id. § 617.6(g)(1)(ii) (determination of nonsignificance must
be made to avoid EIS). In assessing the significance of environmental harm, the agency
must take a "hard look" at the available information and set forth its findings in writing
with a reasoned elaboration and reference to supporting documentation. See id. §
617.6(g)(2) (setting forth requirements for determining significance); H.O.M.E.S. v. New
York State Urban Dev. Corp., 69 A.D.2d 222, 232, 418 N.Y.S.2d 827, 832 (4th Dep't 1979)
(discussing "hard look" standard for determining significance); see also Paden, supra, at 6877 (discussing requirements for determining environmental significance); Donald S. Snider
& Gerald M. Levine, SEQRA: Declarationof Nonsignificance and Issuing a Negative Declaration, N.Y. ST. B.J., July 1986, at 42 passim (providing overview of negative
declarations).
5 N.Y. ENvrL. CONSERv. LAW § 8-0105(4)-(5) (McKinney 1984) (defining actions governed by SEQRA). The definition encompasses activities directly undertaken by the agency
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who should have standing to challenge the sufficiency of environmental assessments required under SEQRA and NEPA has been
left to the courts, since neither act contains provisions for direct
judicial review of such assessments.7 Under the traditional standor supported or regulated by the agency and also includes decisions involving policy, regulations, and procedure-making, id., as well as local laws, codes, ordinances, executive orders,
and resolutions that may affect the environment. [1991] 6 N.Y.C.R.R. § 617.2(b).
8 See Dairylea Coop., Inc. v. Walkley, 38 N.Y.2d 6, 9, 339 N.E.2d 865, 867, 377 N.Y.S.2d
451, 453-54 (1975) ("Whether a person seeking relief is a proper party to request an adjudication is an aspect of justiciability which must be considered at the outset of any litigation."); SIEGEL § 136, at 205 (issue of standing, though arising infrequently in New York, is
"likely to be where administrative action is involved").
Under federal standing doctrine, in order to satisfy the constitutional restriction of judicial authority to "Cases and Controversies," a plaintiff must, at a minimum, show that he
has suffered "injury in fact" fairly traceable to the defendant's actions. See Allen v. Wright,
468 U.S. 737, 750-51 (1975); LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 3-16, at
114-24 (2d ed. 1988). Additional limits on standing are imposed for "prudential" reasons.
Allen, 468 U.S. at 751-52. Standing to challenge administrative action is provided by § 10 of
the Administrative Procedure Act ("APA"), 5 U.S.C. § 702 (1988), to any person "adversely
affected or aggrieved by agency action within the meaning of a relevant statute." Id. In
Association of Data Processing Serv. Org. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150 (1970), the Supreme Court
held that, under the APA, a plaintiff must show injury in fact to an interest that is "arguably within the zone of interests to be protected or regulated by the statute or constitutional
guarantee in question." Id. at 153.
New York has adopted the requirement that the plaintiff show injury in fact to an
interest within the "zone of interests" of the relevant statute to establish standing to challenge state agency action. Dairylea, 38 N.Y.2d at 9, 339 N.E.2d at 867, 377 N.Y.S.2d at 454;
see also New York State Builders Ass'n v. State, 98 Misc. 2d 1045, 1049-50, 414 N.Y.S.2d
956, 959 (Sup. Ct. Albany County 1979) (plaintiff in SEQRA action must show actual injury
within the zone of interests of SEQRA); infra note 8 (discussing zone of interests of
SEQRA). See generally GERRARD ET AL., supra note 2, § 7.07 (standing in SEQRA
litigation).
See Philip Weinberg, A Powerful Mandate: NEPA and State EnvironmentalReview
Acts in the Courts, 5 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 1, 19 (1987). A number of federal statutes contain
"citizen suit" provisions that expressly grant standing to "any person" to enforce the provisions of the statute. See, e.g., Clean Air Act, § 304, 42 U.S.C. § 7604(a) (1988). See generally
RODGERS, supra note 1, at 75-89 (discussing citizen suit provisions in federal statutes). Several state environmental policy acts ("little NEPAs") contain provisions for citizen suits.
See, e.g., Michigan Environmental Protection Act, MICH. CoMP. LAws § 691.1202(1) (1989)
("any person ... may maintain an action ... for the protection of the air, water and other
natural resources ... from pollution, impairment or destruction); New Jersey Environmental Rights Act, N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:35A-4 (West Supp. 1991) (any person has standing to
bring civil suit to enforce statutes or to restrain violation of regulations or ordinances
designed to protect environment). New York rejected a proposed citizen suit bill that would
have granted standing to "any person, whether or not aggrieved ... to make timely intervention before any agency in any proceedings in which damage to the environment might be
at issue." N.Y.S. 3618, 198th Sess. (1975), reprinted in [1975] N.Y. LEGIS. REc. & INDEX
§ 353; see also Society of the Plastics Indus., Inc. v. County of Suffolk, 77 N.Y.2d 761, 77071, 573 N.E.2d 1034, 1039, 570 N.Y.S.2d 778, 783 (1991) (discussing reasons for rejection of
bill).
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ing analysis, the plaintiff must demonstrate "injury in fact" within
the "zone of interests" protected by the statute. Courts employ
this requirement to prevent pressure groups from misusing environmental statutes to obstruct government action and further their
own economic goals." Recently, in Society of the Plastics Industry,
Inc. v. County of Suffolk ("Plastics Society"), 10 the New York
Court of Appeals further limited the pool of complainants that can
challenge agency compliance with SEQRA by requiring claimants
to show that the agency action has caused them special injury, different in kind or degree from that suffered by the general public."
In Plastics Society, the plaintiffs, a Suffolk County manufacturer of fiberglass products and a trade organization representing
the plastics industry, challenged a Suffolk County law banning the
use of nonbiodegradable point-of-sale packaging (the "Plastics
Law").' 2 The plaintiffs alleged, inter alia, that the county legislature, in passing the law, had failed to comply with the requirements of SEQRA. 13 The Plastics Law would require the substitu8See Peter S. Crary, ProceduralIssues Under SEQRA, 46 ALB. L. REV.1211, 1211-23
(1982). Although social and economic interests are to be considered along with environmental concerns, N.Y. ENvT.. CONSERV. LAW § 8-0109(8) (McKinney 1984 & Supp. 1991),
SEQRA was intended to protect the environment, see supra note 2, and only environmental
injury will confer standing. See Mobil Oil Corp. v. Syracuse Indus. Dev. Agency, 76 N.Y.2d
428, 433, 559 N.E.2d 641, 644, 559 N.Y.S.2d 947, 950 (1990); see also New York State Builders Ass'n, 98 Misc. 2d at 1050, 414 N.Y.S.2d at 959 ("Economic injury ...is not within the
zone of interests and cannot serve as a basis for standing under the [SEQRA].").
9 See Mobil Oil, 76 N.Y.2d at 433-34, 559 N.E.2d at 644, 559 N.Y.S.2d at 950 (denying
standing because only economic harm would result to oil company that may have to relocate
facilities on account of challenged redevelopment plan); Young v. Pirro, 170 A.D.2d 1033,
1033-34, 566 N.Y.S.2d 177, 178 (4th Dep't 1991) (standing denied because only economic
harm would result from loss of sales tax revenue to City of Syracuse); New York Horse &
Carriage Ass'n v. Council of the City of New York, 169 A.D.2d 547, 547-48, 564 N.Y.S.2d
399, 400 (1st Dep't) (denying standing because potential harm to New York City's Central
Park would not constitute cognizable injury to enable petitioner to challenge law regulating
horse-drawn carriages), appeal denied, 78 N.Y.2d 851, 577 N.E.2d 60, 573 N.Y.S.2d 69
(1991).
20 77 N.Y.2d 761, 573 N.E.2d 1034, 570 N.Y.S.2d 778 (1991).
11 Id. at 774, 573 N.E.2d at 1041-42, 570 N.Y.S.2d at 785-86.
12 Suffolk County, N.Y., [1988] N.Y. Local Laws 10-1988. Section 3 of the law prohibits
retail food establishments from selling or conveying food "directly to ultimate consumers
within the County of Suffolk unless such food is placed, wrapped, or packed in biodegradable packaging at the conclusion of a sales transaction for the sale of such food." Id.; see
Plastics Society, 77 N.Y.2d at 765-66, 573 N.E.2d at 1036, 570 N.Y.S.2d at 780. For a discussion of local ordinances banning plastic packaging products, see Stephen M. Reck, Note,
The Expanding Environmental Consciousness of Local Government: Municipalities That
Have Banned Styrofoam and the Legal Consequences, 11 U. BRIDGEPORT L. REV. 127 passim (1990).
"3 See PlasticsSociety, 77 N.Y.2d at 767, 573 N.E.2d at 1037, 570 N.Y.S.2d at 781; see
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tion of biodegradable paper products in place of nonbiodegradable
plastic products.' 4 Although this law was intended to reduce
problems associated with solid waste disposal,' 5 opponents introduced evidence that the paper substitutes, when introduced into
the waste stream, could create serious adverse consequences to the
environment.' These effects included increased truck traffic resulting from a greater volume of solid waste, as well as pollution of
the ground water by chemicals released from the disintegrating biodegradable products. 1 The plaintiffs alleged that the Suffolk
County Legislature had failed to comply with SEQRA's mandate
to take a "hard look" at the potential environmental effects of the
proposed law' 8 and that an environmental impact statement
("EIS") should have been prepared before the law was enacted. 9
Suffolk County moved to dismiss the plaintiffs' claims for lack of
standing. 20 To support standing to sue, L. Wittman & Co., a local
fiberglass products manufacturer, 2' alleged, inter alia, that it would
be injured by the increased truck traffic and the potentially polluted ground water.2 2 The Society of the Plastics Industry ("SPI"),
a nationwide trade organization, expressed its members' commitment to the production of plastic products in an environmentally
also supra note 2 (discussing SEQRA requirements). The plaintiffs also challenged the Plastics Law on the grounds that the local law was preempted by state law, that the law violated
the equal protection and due process clauses of the state and federal constitutions, and that
it placed an undue burden on interstate commerce. Plastics Society, 77 N.Y.2d at 766-67,
573 N.E.2d at 1037, 570 N.Y.S.2d at 781. See generally Reck, supra note 12, at 140-59
(exploring possible challenges to laws banning plastic packaging products).
"
See Plastics Society, 77 N.Y.2d at 766, 573 N.E.2d at 1036, 570 N.Y.S.2d at 780.
Id. at 765-66, 573 N.E.2d at 1036, 570 N.Y.S.2d at 780.
16 Id.
at 767-68, 573 N.E.2d at 1037, 570 N.Y.S.2d at 781.
17 Id.
at 767, 573 N.E.2d at 1037, 570 N.Y.S.2d at 781. The intent of the Plastics Law is
to replace nonbiodegradable plastics with paper and biodegradable plastic products. Since
recyclers prefer "clean paper," generally either office waste or newspaper, the paper food
wrappers would probably not be recycled. The result would be an increase in the amount of
solid waste produced in the county and a consequent increase in the truck traffic required to
transport the additional solid waste to the landfills. Once in the landfills, the paper wrappings would disintegrate, releasing chemicals into the landfill, with the resultant risk of
seepage into the Magothy aquifer, Long Island's sole source of drinking water. Id.
'8 See supra note 4 (environmental impact evaluation).
19 Suffolk County had classified the Plastics Law as an unlisted action under SEQRA,
having no significant environmental effects and therefore not requiring an EIS. Society of
the Plastics Indus., Inc. v. County of Suffolk, 154 A.D.2d 179, 182, 552 N.Y.S.2d 138, 140 (2d
Dep't 1990), rev'd, 77 N.Y.2d 761, 573 N.E.2d 1034, 570 N.Y.S.2d 778 (1991).
20 Plastics Society, 77 N.Y.2d at 768, 573 N.E.2d at 1038, 570 N.Y.S.2d at 782.
21 Id. at 776, 573 N.E.2d at 1043, 570 N.Y.S.2d at 787.
22 Id. at 767-68, 573 N.E.2d at 1037, 570 N.Y.S.2d at 781.
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sound manner and identified potential environmental injuries to
its Suffolk County members.2
The Supreme Court, Suffolk County, upheld the plaintiffs'
standing,24 determined that Suffolk County had violated SEQRA,
and stayed implementation of the Plastics Law pending preparation of an EIS. 25 The Appellate Division, Second Department, affirmed the supreme court's findings and vacated the Plastics Law
ab initio,28 stating that the Suffolk County Legislature had ignored
significant evidence of potential environmental harm, in clear violation of SEQRA
A divided Court of Appeals reversed, dismissing the plaintiffs'
SEQRA claims for lack of standing.28 Writing for the majority,
Judge Kaye determined that the lead plaintiff, SPI, "plainly" did
not have standing to maintain a SEQRA challenge. 29 To establish

standing to sue on behalf of its members, Judge Kaye noted that
an association must demonstrate that the interests it asserts are
germane to its purpose.3 0 SPI had sought to protect its members'
rights "themselves to be free of any adverse effects a local law
might have on their own immediate environment," a matter bearing no relation to SPI's concerns as a nationwide trade
organization.

3

1

The majority of the court decided that L. Wittman & Co., the
only remaining plaintiff, had failed to demonstrate that it would
suffer injury "different in kind or degree" from that suffered by
the public at large and, therefore, lacked standing to sue.3 2 The
court determined that the impact of the law would fall on those
residing closest to the points of disposal.33 Harmful effects from
23

Id.

24 Id. at 768, 573 N.E.2d at 1037-38, 570 N.Y.S.2d at 781-82.
23

Id.

26 Society of the Plastics Indus., Inc. v. County of Suffolk, 154 A.D.2d 179, 183, 552
N.Y.S.2d 138, 141 (2d Dep't 1990), rev'd, 77 N.Y.2d 761, 573 N.E.2d 1034, 570 N.Y.S.2d 778
(1991).
27 Id.
28 Plastics Society, 77 N.Y.2d at 768, 573 N.E.2d at 1038, 570 N.Y.S.2d at 782.
29

Id. at 776, 573 N.E.2d at 1043, 570 N.Y.S.2d at 787.

-0 Id. at 776, 573 N.E.2d at 1043, 570 N.Y.S.2d at 787. When an organization is the
petitioner, it must satisfy three requirements in order to establish standing: (1) one or more
of its members must have standing; (2) it must demonstrate that the interests it is asserting
are germane to its purpose; and (3) the participation of the individual members must not be
necessary. Id. at 775, 573 N.E.2d at 1042, 570 N.Y.S.2d at 786.
21 Id. at 776, 573 N.E.2d at 1043, 570 N.Y.S.2d at 787.
22

Id. at 778, 573 N.E.2d at 1044, 570 N.Y.S.2d at 788.

33

Id.
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the increased volume of solid waste flowing into the landfills would
be greatest near the landfills, and any harm resulting from increased truck traffic to and from the landfills would fall on those
near this traffic.3 4 Thus, these residents would be able to show the
required "special or differentiating harm."3 5 Denying standing to
these plaintiffs would therefore not have the effect of immunizing
the governmental action from judicial review. 3 Finally, noting that
the plaintiffs' ultimate interests in challenging the law were economic rather than environmental, 37 the court suggested that judicial review should be limited when pressure groups seek to use remedial legislation, such as SEQRA, to obstruct government
action.3
Judge Hancock, in a dissent joined by Judges Simons and
Titone, 39 argued that the use of the special injury requirement is
limited to cases in which the environmental harm would be sitespecific 40 and asserted that there was no support in the record for
the majority's characterization of the alleged environmental effects
as "localized." ' 41 In addition, the dissent disagreed with the major-

ity's suggestion that the plaintiffs' economic interests were relevant
to the standing analysis and maintained that the only issue is
whether the plaintiff established environmental harm.42
It is submitted that the special injury requirement imposed by
the Court of Appeals has effectively closed the courts for review of
significant environmental issues and is not necessary to prevent
the misuse of the statute by pressure groups. It is further asserted
that when evaluating a plaintiff's standing under SEQRA, courts
should focus on the legitimacy of the environmental claims rather
than the ulterior motives behind the suit.
3' Id. at 778-79, 573 N.E.2d at 1044, 570 N.Y.S.2d at 788.
35 Id. at 779, 573 N.E.2d at 1044, 570 N.Y.S.2d at 788.
36 Id. Since this case presented a "large pool of potential plaintiffs" who could allege
the special injury necessary for standing, the court decided that it "need not ... reach the
issue whether, in instances where solely general harm would result from a proposed action, a

plaintiff would have standing to raise a SEQRA challenge based on potential injury to the
community at large." Id.
31Id. at 777, 573 N.E.2d at 1043-44, 570 N.Y.S.2d at 787-88.
38 Id. at 779, 573 N.E.2d at 1045, 570 N.Y.S.2d at 789.
Id. at 794, 573 N.E.2d at 1054, 570 N.Y.S.2d at 798 (Hancock, J., dissenting).
Id. at 787-88, 573 N.E.2d at 1050, 570 N.Y.S.2d at 794 (Hancock, J., dissenting).
Id. at 791, 573 N.E.2d at 1052, 570 N.Y.S.2d at 796 (Hancock, J., dissenting). Judge
Hancock argued that the Plastics Law is not a regulation of landfills; the potential contamination of drinking water is a threat to every resident. Id.
42 Id. at 791-92, 573 N.E.2d at 1053, 570 N.Y.S.2d at 797 (Hancock, J., dissenting).
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The special injury requirement is at odds with federal standing doctrine 43 and represents a new and unfavorable development
in New York's law on standing to challenge compliance with
SEQRA.4 4 The special injury requirement creates the possibility

"sSee United States v. Students Challenging Regulatory Agency Procedures (SCRAP),
412 U.S. 669, 688 (1973). "To deny standing to persons who are in fact injured simply because many others are also injured, would mean that the most injurious and widespread
Government actions could be questioned by nobody." Id.
To establish standing to challenge agency action under NEPA, injury in fact requires
"simple allegations that plaintiff[s] ... use the land or resources affected by agency action."
Katherine B. Steuer & Robin L. Juni, Note, Court Access for Environmental Plaintiffs:
Standing Doctrine in Lujan v. National Wildlife Federation, 15 HARV. ENvmL L. REv. 187,
194 (1991) (analyzing SCRAP and Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727 (1972)). Under federal doctrine, in order to survive summary judgment, a plaintiff must establish that the
agency action affects him in some specific manner. Lujan v. National Wildlife Fed'n, 110 S.
Ct. 3177, 3187-88 (1990). Thus, a conclusory allegation of injury arising from the use of large
tracts of land potentially affected by agency action was insufficient to establish standing.
Id.; see also Steuer & Juni, supra, at 187 (nexus required between agency action and land
used by plaintiff).
The federal courts deny standing to assert "generalized grievances," Warth v. Seldin,
422 U.S. 490, 499 (1975), but in the sense that abstract or ideological injuries do not amount
to injury in fact for standing purposes. See TRIBE, supra note 6, § 3-17, at 124-29.
" Plastics Society, 77 N.Y.2d at 785-88, 573 N.E.2d at 1048-50, 570 N.Y.S.2d at 792-94
(Hancock, J., dissenting). The dissent points out a number of cases in which plaintiffs alleging harm common to the general public were allowed to sue. Id.; see also Industrial Liaison
Comm. v. Williams, 131 A.D.2d 205, 521 N.Y.S.2d 321 (3d Dep't 1987), aff'd, 72 N.Y.2d 137,
527 N.E.2d 274, 531 N.Y.S.2d 791 (1988). The plaintiff in Industrial Liaison had standing
even though it asserted "speculative" injury resulting merely from its "use" of potentially
polluted surface waters. Id. at 210, 521 N.Y.S.2d at 324-25. The New York Court of Appeals
affirmed without addressing the plaintiff's standing. Industrial Liaison Comm. v. Williams,
72 N.Y.2d 137, 527 N.E.2d 274, 531 N.Y.S.2d 791 (1988). Similarly, the holding in Plastics
Society is at odds with the policy announced by the Court of Appeals in 1974: that disposing of land-use disputes over questions of standing is inconsistent with the rules of standing
in other fields. Douglaston Civic Ass'n v. Galvin, 36 N.Y.2d 1, 6, 324 N.E.2d 317, 320, 364
N.Y.S.2d 830, 834 (1974); see also Dairylea Coop., Inc. v. Walkley, 38 N.Y.2d 6, 10, 339
N.E.2d 685, 689, 377 N.Y.S.2d 451, 455 (1975) ("The increasing pervasiveness of administrative influence on daily life on both the State and Federal level necessitates a concomitant
broadening of the category of persons entitled to a judicial determination as to the validity
of proposed action."); Plastics Society, 77 N.Y.2d at 793-94, 573 N.E.2d at 1054, 570
N.Y.S.2d at 798 (Hancock, J., dissenting) (court's ruling is counter to established policy).
Plastics Society is the first case in which the Court of Appeals has denied standing to
challenge compliance with SEQRA based on failure to show special injury. The dissent in
Plastics Society argued that the court's earlier statement in Mobil Oil Corp. v. Syracuse
Indus. Dev. Agency, 76 N.Y.2d 428, 559 N.E.2d 641, 559 N.Y.S.2d 947 (1990), to the effect
that special injury was required for standing to challenge SEQRA compliance, id. at 433, 559
N.E.2d at 644, 559 N.Y.S.2d at 950, was based on the plaintiff's failure to allege any environmental harm, which was not the case here. See Plastics Society, 77 N.Y.2d at 791 n.8,
573 N.E.2d at 1052 n.8, 570 N.Y.S.2d at 796 n.8. (Hancock, J., dissenting); cf. id. at 774-75 &
n.1, 573 N.E.2d at 1046 & n.1, 570 N.Y.S.2d at 786 & n.1. In HAR Enters. v. Town of
Brookhaven, 74 N.Y.2d 524, 548 N.E.2d 1289, 549 N.Y.S.2d 638 (1989), the court held that
the owner of property that is the subject of agency action is presumptively aggrieved and
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that relatively fewer parties will have standing as the number of
parties injured by agency action multiplies. 45 In addition, application of a special injury standard creates a paradox: the plaintiff
must first demonstrate to the court that the potential environmental harm threatens him to a greater degree than the public at large
before he may obtain the relief requested-that the agency must
investigate the extent of this harm.4 6
Although deeply rooted in public nuisance doctrine, 47 this special injury requirement has been criticized and, in some cases,
phased out of this area of the law in order to allow private enforcement of public environmental interests. 48 The Plastics Society
need not show special injury. Id. at 529, 548 N.E.2d at 1293, 549 N.Y.S.2d at 642. But see
New York Horse & Carriage Ass'n v. Council of the City of New York, 169 A.D.2d 547, 54748, 564 N.Y.S.2d 399, 400 (1st Dep't) (environmental impact on Central Park not an injury
different in kind from that suffered by community generally), appeal denied, 78 N.Y.2d 851,
577 N.E.2d 60, 573 N.Y.S.2d 69 (1991); Big V Supermarkets v. Town of Wallkill, 154 A.D.2d
669, 669-70, 546 N.Y.S.2d 668, 669-70 (2d Dep't 1990) (distance from plaintiffs' property to
proposed shopping center creates no inference of injury in fact).
46 See supra notes 39-41; PlasticsSociety, 77 N.Y.2d at 788-89, 573 N.E.2d at 1050-51,
570 N.Y.S.2d at 794-95; David R. Hodas, Private Actions for Public Nuisance: Common
Law Citizen Suits for Relief from Environmental Harm, 16 ECOLOGY L.Q. 883, 891 (1989)
(illogical and dangerous to retain rule that produces less liability as harm becomes more
widespread). The Plastics Society court expressly reserved the question of standing to challenge actions that affect the public in a purely indiscriminate manner. 77 N.Y.2d at 781, 573
N.E.2d at 1046, 570 N.Y.S.2d at 790. It is not clear what constitutes indiscriminate harm
nor is it clear whether plaintiffs suffering from indiscriminate harm should be allowed access
to the courts. See id. at 769, 573 N.E.2d at 1038, 570 N.Y.S.2d at 782. (issue of wide public
concern can be addressed by legislatures).
In Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n, Inc. v. Jorling, 577 N.Y.S.2d 346 (Sup. Ct. Albany County
1991), the plaintiffs challenged a regulation that would require all new motor vehicles sold
in New York state to comply with stricter "California" emissions standards. Id. at 347. The
plaintiffs alleged that the new emissions standard could increase ozone and carbon monoxide pollution levels and that as landowners they would suffer injury. Id. at 349-50. The court
granted standing to the plaintiffs, concluding that the potential air pollution would be "entirely indiscriminate in effect," and as such, the special injury requirement was inapplicable.
Id.
I4 William A. Fletcher, The Structure of Standing, 98 YALE L.J. 221, 259 & n.179
(1988). The paradox explained in the text arises to an extent out of the injury in fact requirement for standing. By requiring injury different in kind or degree from the public at
large, this effect is exacerbated. Id.
47 William L. Prosser, Private Action for Public Nuisance, 52 VA. L. REV. 997, 1005
(1966) (tracing rule to 1536). This requirement was imposed on the standing doctrine because, inter alia, the duty to enforce the law was properly left to the king (or state), and
normally the interference with the public at large was petty or trivial. The special injury
requirement also promotes the interest in preventing multiple suits arising from the same
acts. Id. at 1007.
" See Akau v. Olohana Corp., 652 P.2d 1130, 1133 (Haw. 1982) (plaintiff without special injury had standing as long as injury in fact could be demonstrated); Hodas, supra note
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court contended that denying standing to these plaintiffs was consistent with the policy of limiting challenges by pressure groups
seeking to delay governmental action in order to further their own
economic interests.49 If applied uniformly, however, the added special injury requirement will also bar environmentally concerned
groups.50 The court may be interested in granting standing more
freely to claimants who have purely environmental interests,5 1 but
this objective can be accomplished more fairly by relaxing standards for environmental groups5 2 rather than barring legitimate
claims of environmental harm by claimants with economic inter53
ests at stake as well.
The special injury requirement creates the possibility that
state agency action with potentially damaging effects on New
York's parks, forests, beaches, and water supply can elude review.
It is suggested that the Plastics Society court erred in denying
standing to the ordinary citizen who uses these resources and who
may be aggrieved by area-wide rather than localized environmental
45, at 888-903. The potential for widespread harm resulting from modern environmental
nuisances outweighs the policy reasons for the special injury requirement. See id. at 884-85;
supra note 42 (discussing Plastics Society dissent). The courts have at their disposal other
methods of limiting the multiplicity of lawsuits that can arise out of a public nuisance,
including joining the plaintiffs as a class or imposing sanctions for frivolous lawsuits. Hodas,
supra note 45, at 889.
" PlasticsSociety, 77 N.Y.2d at 779, 573 N.E.2d at 1045, 570 N.Y.S.2d at 789; see also
supra note 9 and accompanying text (discussing instances in which groups were denied
standing).
"0 See, e.g., Otsego 2000, Inc. v. Planning Bd., 171 A.D.2d 258, 575 N.Y.S.2d 584, 585
(3d Dep't 1991) (denying standing to environmental conservation group who failed to show
any members suffered special injury).
" Plastics Society, 77 N.Y.2d at 793, 573 N.E.2d 1053-54, 570 N.Y.S.2d at 797-98
(Hancock, J., dissenting) (if majority suggests that new rule might not apply to groups with
"pure" environmental interests, it has not explained why remedy should be foreclosed
merely because plaintiff has economic interest).
52 See Jeanne A. Compitello, Comment, Organizational Standing in Environmental
Litigation, 6 ToURo L. REv. 295, 296 (1990) (standing should be granted to environmental
groups to protect public's interest); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 821(C) (1977)
(standing should be given to representative of general public to enjoin or abate public
nuisance).
" See Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n, Inc. v. Jorling, 577 N.Y.S.2d 346 (Sup. Ct. Albany
County 1991). In Motor Vehicle Mfrs., the plaintiffs, including Chrysler Corp., Ford Motor
Co., General Motors Corp., and Bob Johnson Chevrolet, were granted standing to challenge,
on environmental grounds, an automobile emissions regulation. Id. at 350. Although these
plaintiffs seemed to be the type of economically interested parties to whom the Plastics
Society court would have denied judicial review, the supreme court focused instead on the
claimant's environmental injuries and allowed them to challenge the regulation. Id. at 34950; see also supra note 45 (discussing Motor Vehicle Mfrs.).
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harm. It is further suggested that a standing doctrine which requires the claimant to establish only "injury in fact" rather than
"special injury" will be adequate to eliminate frivolous claims of
environmental injury while ensuring that clear violations of
SEQRA do not go unpoliced. New York claimants, especially those
with economic interests at stake, who have suffered environmental
harm but cannot demonstrate special injury, may not be able to
challenge the agency action causing this harm. As a practical matter, environmental groups intending to challenge agency actions
must be careful to identify members who have suffered special
injury.5
ChristopherP. Malloy
New York Court of Appeals holds that court may look beyond
four corners of complaint to determine insurance company's duty
to defend
Traditionally, when determining the sufficiency of pleadings
on a motion to dismiss,' New York courts examine the allegations
set forth within the "four corners of the complaint."2 As long as
allegations in the complaint state a valid cause of action, the motion to dismiss will fail. 3 Similarly, an insurer's obligation to de" Implementation of the Suffolk Lantz Plastics Law is expected to begin early in 1992.
See John Barbanel, Suffolk County's Ban on Plastics Loses Allies, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 31,
1991, at Al. The decision to implement the law was made despite requests from the New
York State Department of Environmental Conservation to delay enforcement of the law
pending a study of its potential impact on Long Island's garbage disposal pollutants. Id.
Environmentalists and plastics industry representatives alike question whether the law will
have a positive impact on Suffolk's solid waste disposal problems, and small business owners
and supermarket chains are concerned about the law's potential adverse affects on the economy. Id.

1

See CPLR 3211 (McKinney 1970 & Supp. 1991); see also SIEGEL §§ 257-258, at 387-89

(discussing motion to dismiss for failure to state cause of action); 4 WK&M 1 3211.29
(same).
2 See, e.g., Guggenheimer v. Ginzburg, 43 N.Y.2d 268, 275, 372 N.E.2d 17, 20, 401
N.Y.S.2d 182, 185 (1977) (stating that sole determining factor in deciding motion to dismiss
is whether allegations in complaint state cause of action); Foley v. D'Agostino, 21 A.D.2d 60,
64-65, 248 N.Y.S.2d 121, 126-27 (lst Dep't 1964) (same).
' See Meyers & Sons Corp. v. Zurich Am. Ins. Group, 74 N.Y.2d 298, 302, 545 N.E.2d
1206, 1208, 546 N.Y.S.2d 818, 820 (1989); Guggenheimer, 43 N.Y.2d at 275, 372 N.E.2d at
20, 401 N.Y.S.2d at 185. In Guggenheimer,the Court of Appeals explained that "[ilnitially,
the sole criterion [in determining whether a motion to dismiss should be granted] is whether
the pleading states a cause of action, and if from its four corners factual allegations are
discerned which taken together manifest any cause of action cognizable at law a motion for

